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Summary. This note provides a new proof of the non-emptiness of the fuzzy
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1 Introduction
The fuzzy core was introduced by Aubin (1979) as the set of allocations of a pure
exchange economy that are robust to blockings by all fuzzy coalitions. To interpret
a fuzzy coalition, one thinks of an economy as being comprised of several types of
agents, with each type being represented by a continuum of identical individuals.
The fuzzy coalition then speciﬁes the number (the mass) of the participants of each
type.
The fuzzy core is known to be non-empty under very general conditions. In
particular, Florenzano (2003) establishes the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core in an
inﬁnite-dimensional production economy (see Proposition 5.2.3, p. 115).
This note provides a new proof of the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core. The
proof is based on the concept of the (Π,β)-balanced core for games without side
payments, a special case of the so-called core with additional requirements intro-
duced recently in Bonnisseau and Iehl´ e (2003). A given economy gives rise to a
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non-transferable utility game whose (Π,β)-balanced core corresponds, in a nat-
ural way, to the  -fuzzy core of the original economy. The non-emptiness of the
fuzzy core can therefore be deduced from the non-emptiness result for the (Π,β)-
balanced core in Bonnisseau and Iehl´ e (2003).
Our non-emptiness result is weaker than that provided by Proposition 5.2.3 in
Florenzano (2003). The result in Florenzano (2003) applies to an economy with a
non-trivial production sector, while our construction is limited to pure exchange
economies. Furthermore, to transform the problem of the non-emptiness of the
fuzzy core into that of the non-emptiness of the (Π,β)-balanced core, we have
to rely on the existence of the utility functions. This is in contrast to the result
in Florenzano (2003), where the consumer preferences may lack completeness or
transitivity. On the other hand, we are able to maintain quite general assumptions
with respect to the commodity space of an economy.As in Florenzano (2003), the
commodity space in this paper is a general (possibly inﬁnite-dimensional) linear
Hausdorff topological space.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 some notation is
introduced. In Section 3 the fuzzy core and the  -fuzzy core are deﬁned. In Section
4 some preliminary results are presented, including the non-emptiness result for
the (Π,β)-balanced core. In Section 5 the non-emptiness of the  -fuzzy core is
demonstrated.
2 Notation
Let n be a positive integer. Then N is the set of integers {1,...,n}, and N is the
collection of non-empty subsets of the set N. Given an S ∈ N, the symbol RS
denotes the space of functions x : i ∈ S  → xi ∈ R. The symbol RN denotes the
space of functions λ : S ∈ N  → λS ∈ R. Let ∆N denote the unit simplex in RN,
thus ∆N = {πN ∈ RN |πi
N ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and
 
i∈N πi
N =1 }. For each
S ∈ N let ∆S be a face of ∆N deﬁned as ∆S = {πS ∈ ∆N |πi
S =0for all i ∈
N\S}. Given an   ∈ (0,1/n), let ∆ 
S = {πS ∈ ∆S |πi
S ≥   for all i ∈ S}. Let β
denote the barycenter of ∆N. For a subset A of RN, the symbols intA, ∂A, and
coA denote, respectively, the interior, the boundary, and the convex hull of A.
3 Fuzzy core
We consider a pure exchange economy E in which the set of agents is N, and
the commodity space is C. Each agent i ∈ N is characterized by a consumption
set Xi ⊆ C, initial endowment of commodities ei ∈ C, and a utility function






(A2) For each i ∈ N, the set Xi is a closed convex set containing ei, and the
set F(E)=
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(A3) For each i ∈ N the utility function ui is a continuous and quasi-concave
function.
Deﬁnition 1 An allocation x ∈ F(E) is an element of the fuzzy core Cf(E) of
the economy E if there exist no π ∈ ∆N and no χ ∈ XN such that
 
i∈N πiχi =  
i∈N πiei and ui(χi) >u i(xi) for all i ∈ N with πi > 0.
Itisinstrumentaltoconsiderthefollowingmodiﬁcationofthefuzzycore,called
the  -fuzzy core. In the  -fuzzy core it is required that for any fuzzy coalition π
with support S the mass πi of the participants of each type i ∈ S be at least  >0.
Deﬁnition 2 An allocation x ∈ F(E) is an element of the  -fuzzy core Cf
  (E) of
the economy E if there exist no S ⊆ N,n oπ ∈ ∆ 
S and no χ ∈ XS such that  
i∈S πiχi =
 
i∈S πiei and ui(χi) >u i(xi) for all i ∈ S.
Theorem 1 Foreach  ∈ (0,1/n),the -fuzzycoreoftheeconomyEisnon-empty.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section 5. Our main result is the following.
Theorem 2 The fuzzy core of the economy E is non-empty.
Proof. To proveTheorem 2 we consider fuzzy core as a limit of the  -fuzzy core as
  approaches zero. Observe that Cf
  (E) ⊆ C
f
 (E) whenever 0 < ≤   . Moreover,






Since the non-emptiness of the  -fuzzy core follows from Theorem 1, it sufﬁces
to demonstrate that Cf
  (E) is a compact set. We show that it is a closed subset of
F(E).
Let x be a point of F(E) not in Cf
  (E). Then there exist S ⊆ N, π ∈ ∆ 
S and
χ ∈ XS as in Deﬁnition 2. For a ﬁxed χ, the inequalities ui(χi) >u i(xi), i ∈ S,
deﬁne an open neighborhood of x in F(E) contained entirely in the complement
of Cf
  (E). Thus, the complement of Cf
  (E) in F(E) is an open set, as desired.    
4 (Π,β)-balanced core
An n-person game with non-transferable utility (hereafter referred to simply as a
game) is a family of sets V =  V (S) S∈N satisfying the following assumptions.
For all S ∈ N
(G1) V (S) is a non-empty closed subset of RN.
(G2) [v ∈ V (S), ¯ v ∈ RN, ¯ vi ≤ vi for all i ∈ S] implies [¯ v ∈ V (S)].
(G3) There is a number M such that vi ≤ M for all i ∈ S and v ∈ V (S).





intV (S).720 A. Predtetchinski
Given v ∈ RN, let S(v)={S ∈ N|v ∈ ∂V(S)}.
The (Π,β)-balanced core is a special case of the so-called core with additional
requirements for games with non-transferable utility introduced in Bonnisseau and
Iehl´ e(2003).Itgeneralizestheideaofthesociallystablecoreforsociallystructured
games in Herings, Laan, and Talman (2003).
Deﬁnition 3 Let V be a game. For each S ∈ N let ΠS : ∂V(S) → ∆S be a
correspondence with non-empty convex values and with a closed graph. Then the
(Π,β)-balanced core of the game V is the set of points v in the core of V such that
β ∈ co{ΠS(v) | S ∈S (v)}.
Thusthe(Π,β)-balancedcoreisaselectionfromthecore.Ifthecorrespondence
ΠN maps each utility tuple v into the one-point set {β}, then the (Π,β)-balanced
core of V coincides with the core of V .
The (Π,β)-balancedness condition for games without side payments belongs
to the class of payoff-dependent balancedness conditions studied in Bonnisseau
and Iehl´ e (2003). A related reference is Predtetchinski and Herings (2004), where
payoff-dependent balancedness is shown to be a necessary and sufﬁcient condition
for the non-emptiness of the core.
Deﬁnition 4 Let V be a game. For each S ∈ N let ΠS : ∂V(S) → ∆S be a
correspondence with non-empty convex values and with a closed graph. The game
V is said to be (Π,β)-balanced provided that the following condition is satisﬁed:
if v ∈ RN and β ∈ co{ΠS(v) | S ∈S (v)}, then v ∈ V (N).
FortheproofofTheorem3thereaderisreferredtoBonnisseauandIehl´ e(2003).
Theorem 3 Let V be a game. For each S ∈ N let ΠS : ∂V(S) → ∆S be a
correspondence with non-empty convex values and with a closed graph. Suppose
that the game V is (Π,β)-balanced. Then the (Π,β)-balanced core of the game
V is non-empty.
5 The non-emptiness of the  -fuzzy core
In this section we prove Theorem 1. Given a number   ∈ (0,1/n) and an economy
E, we construct a non-transferable utility game V   and the correspondences ΠS as
follows: In the game V  , the utility tuple v is considered feasible for a coalition S
if it is feasible for some fuzzy coalition πS with support S in the original economy
E. Given a vector of utilities v in ∂V  (S),w el e tΠS(v) to consist of those fuzzy
coalitions πS that can achieve the utility of v. We then show that the game V   is
(Π,β)-balanced and that its (Π,β)-balanced core corresponds, under the utility
functions, to the  -fuzzy core of the economy E.
Given S ∈ N, let
Z (S)=
 























there exists (xS,π S) ∈ Z (S) such that
ui(xi
S) ≥ vi for all i ∈ S
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Proposition 1 For each   ∈ (0,1/n), Z (S) is a non-empty and compact set.
Proof. For each   ∈ (0,1/n), the set ∆ 
S is non-empty, and Z (S) contains a non-
empty subset {eS}×∆ 
S, where ei
S = ei for all i ∈ S. Deﬁne FS(E) to be the set





















xN ∈ XN | xi
N = ei for all i ∈ N\S
 
.
By assumption (A2), C is a Hausdorff space, so a one-point set {ei} is closed in




















for each i ∈ S. Then
Z (S)=( XS × ∆ 
S)
 
ϕ(FS(E) × ∆ 
S).
The product of the compact sets FS(E) and ∆ 
S is a compact set, and so is its image
under ϕ. Thus Z (S) is a closed subset of a compact set; therefore, it is a compact
set.    
Proposition 2 Foreach  ∈ (0,1/n),thefamilyofsetsV   =  V  (S) S∈N satisﬁes
conditions (G1)-(G3).
Proof. Condition (G2) is satisﬁed by deﬁnition of V  (S). To verify conditions









there exists ˙ v ∈ ˙ V  (S) such that
˙ vi ≥ vi for all i ∈ S
 
,
where ˙ V  (S) is deﬁned by








there exists (xS,π S) ∈ Z (S) such that
ui(xi
S)=vi for all i ∈ S
 
.
The set ˙ V  (S) is the image of the set Z (S) under the composition of the maps
XS × ∆ 
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where the ﬁrst map is the natural projection, and the second map is a Cartesian
productofthefunctionsui fori ∈ S.Itfollowsthat ˙ V  (S)isanon-emptycompact
subset of RS; in particular, it is bounded from above. From this one can easily see
that the set V  (S) satisﬁes conditions (G1) and (G3).    
Weremarkthatfor  =0thefamilyofsetsV   mayfailtomeetconditions(G1)
and (G3), since Z0(S) is not, generally, a compact set. It is to avoid this difﬁculty
that the  -fuzzy cores and the corresponding games V   were introduced.
Deﬁne the correspondences ΠS : ∂V  (S) → ∆ 
S as follows. Given v ∈


























Proposition 3 For each v ∈ ∂V  (S) the set ΠS(v) is non-empty and convex. The
correspondence ΠS has a closed graph.
Proof. The set ΠS(v) is non-empty by deﬁnition of V  (S). To prove that it is
a convex set, let πS,π 
S ∈ ΠS(v) and t ∈ [0,1] be given. We must show that
  πS = tπS +(1−t)π 
S is an element ΠS(v). Let xS, x 







S) ≥ vi for all i ∈ S, and similarly for x 
S.
Given i ∈ S let   xi








S +( 1− t)π i
Sx i
S]
By convexity of the consumption sets one has   xi
S ∈ Xi. By quasi-concavity of the
utility function, ui(  xi






























Thus,   πS ∈ ΠS(v), as desired.













there exists ˙ v ∈ RS such that
(˙ v,πS) ∈ ˙ G and
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there exists xS ∈ XS such that
(xS,π S) ∈ Z (S)
ui(xi





Then the set ˙ G is the image of Z (S) under the continuous map XS × ∆ 
S →
RS ×∆ 
S, which is a Cartesian product of the utility functions ui for i ∈ S and the
identity map on ∆ 
S. It follows from Proposition 1 that ˙ G is a compact set. From
this one can easily see that the set G is closed in ∂V  (S) × ∆ 
S.    
Theorem 4 Let the game V   and the correspondences ΠS : ∂V  (S) → ∆ 
S be
deﬁned by Equations 1–3. Let the commodity allocation x be an element of the
 -fuzzy core of the economy E. Then the utility tuple v is an element of the (Π,β)-
balanced core of the game V  , where vi = ui(xi) for all i ∈ N. Conversely, let
the utility tuple v be an element of the (Π,β)-balanced core of the game V  . Then
there exists a commodity allocation x in the  -fuzzy core of the economy E such
that vi ≥ ui(xi) for all i ∈ N.
Proof. Letthecommodityallocationxbeinthe -fuzzycoreoftheeconomyE.Let
v ∈ RN begivenbyvi = ui(xi)foralli ∈ N.Thenv isinthecoreofthegameV  ,
forotherwisexwouldnotbestableagainstdeviationsbyfuzzycoalitionsπS in∆ 
S.
Furthermore, because x is feasible for the coalition N, the inclusion β ∈ ΠN(v)
holds, and therefore v is in the (Π,β)-balanced core of V  .
Conversely, let the vector of utilities v be in the (Π,β)-balanced core of the
game V  . Then for each S ∈S (v), there exists a vector πS ∈ ΠS(v) and a










S for all i ∈ N.
It follows from the deﬁnition of the game V   (Equations 1 and 2) that for every











S) ≥ vi for all i ∈ S.









The consumption vector ¯ xi
N is a weighted average of the vectors xi
S over those
coalitions S ∈S (v) that contain player i. By convexity of the consumption sets,
¯ xi
N is an element of Xi. By quasi-concavity of the utility functions,
ui(¯ xi






















S − ei]=0 .
Weseethattheallocation ¯ xN isanelementofthesetF(E).Sincev isnotaninterior
pointofanysetV  (S),theallocation ¯ xN isrobusttodeviationsbyfuzzycoalitions
πS ∈ ∆ 
S for all S ∈ N. Thus, ¯ xN is in the  -fuzzy core of the economy E.    
Theorem 5 The game V   is (Π,β)-balanced.
We omit the proof of this theorem as it is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.
Theorem5impliesthatthe(Π,β)-balancedcoreofthegameV   isnon-empty.Our
argument is now complete.
References
Aubin, J.-P.: Mathematical methods of game and economic theory.Amsterdam: North-Holland 1979
Bonnisseau, J.-M., Iehl´ eV.: Payoffs-dependent balancedness and cores. Cahiers de la MSE S´ erie Bleue




Research Memorandum 03/009, Universiteit Maastricht, pp. 1–24 (2003)
Predtetchinski, A., Herings, P.J.J.: A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for non-emptiness of the core
of a non-transferable utility game. Journal of Economic Theory 116, 84–92 (2004)